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Messori and Micossi’s reading of the Franco-
German 7+7 paper is a misrepresentation 
Jean Pisani-Ferry and Jeromin Zettelmeyer 
Rejecting the critique by Messrs Messori and Micossi of their earlier paper as “fundamentally 
inaccurate and misleading”, Jean Pisani-Ferry and Jeromin Zettelmeyer offer a succinct rebuttal 
in this new contribution. 
ogether with 12 other French and German economists of various affiliations and 
viewpoints, we recently published a report that proposes a comprehensive reform of the 
euro area.1 Our aim was to trigger a debate on the fundamental reforms that are needed 
to ensure the resilience of the euro area and turn it into an engine for collective prosperity. As 
we very deliberately crossed the usual national red lines – because we thought that the 
acceptance of the corresponding constraints was bound to result in an insufficiently ambitious, 
and possibly empty compromise – we did not expect our proposals to be consensual. We were 
especially conscious that some of them would elicit opposition among colleagues who are 
especially sensitive to the risk of financial instability. Because of Italy’s high debt and its recent 
banking problems, many Italian economists rightly have such concerns. Several of our 
recommendations were in fact designed in light of the Italian situation and the imperative to 
reconcile the need for bold reforms with the necessity to avoid triggering turmoil.  
We therefore welcome the contribution by Marcello Messori and Stefano Micossi (M&M), with 
whom we had the opportunity to discuss our ideas before the report was published.2 There are 
many things on which we agree, as they note in passing in their paper. But we were shocked by 
the way in which their piece misrepresents our analysis and our proposals. Having read it 
                                                     
1 A. Bénassy-Quéré, M. Brunnermeier, H. Enderlein, E. Farhi, M. Fratzscher, C. Fuest, P.O. Gourinchas, P. Martin, J. 
Pisani-Ferry, H. Rey, I. Schnabel, N. Véron, B. Weder di Mauro and J. Zettelmeyer, “Reconciling risk sharing with 
market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform”, CEPR Policy Insight No. 91, Centre for Economic 
Policy Research, London, January 2018. 
2 M. Messori and S. Micossi, “Counterproductive Proposals on Euro Area Reform by French and German 
Economists”, CEPS Policy Insight No. 2018/04, CEPS, Brussels, February 2018.  
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carefully, we cannot escape the impression that they have built a strawman characterised as 
largely aligned with the propositions put forward in a non-paper circulated by former German 
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. This is most visible in the table in which they provide what 
they regard as evidence of such an alignment. But their reading is a fundamentally inaccurate 
and misleading presentation of our ideas.  
This is unfortunate. At the present juncture, the euro area needs genuine, honest debate, not 
the cultivation of cultural and national prejudices. To play down points of agreements 
systematically while emphasising points of contention ends up creating the false impression 
that our perspectives are fundamentally different. It is factually wrong and politically toxic to 
pretend that our proposals “do not differ in substance from Schäuble’s on the critical issues of 
financial stability in the euro area and the balance between risk reduction and risk sharing, and 
in some respects are even more rigid”. To follow this route promises the surest way to prevent 
the type of debate Europe urgently needs and instead to fuel unhelpful acrimony.   
We respect our critics’ right to disagree with our views, and we are keen to engage with them. 
But we would like to be criticised on the basis of what we actually say. 
1. Banking union 
• M&M's main claim is that we are calling for the removal of the financial stability 
exception to bail-in rules. The basis for this claim seems to be point (4) in the first 
paragraph of p. 7 and footnote 4 on the same page. However, the footnote says that 
exemption "should not be generally presumed, but assessed on a case-by-case basis". 
M&M suggest that this would prohibit having recourse to the exception in case of 
systemic crisis, which is plainly wrong. In fact, we do not suggest any redrafting of either 
the systemic exemptions in the bank recovery and resolution Directive (BRRD) or the 
treaty basis for systemic-risk exemptions under state aid control, but only a revision of 
the Banking Communication (BC) of 2013 on the application of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis, which was explicitly 
linked to a context of systemic banking crisis. Unless one assumes that the EU banking 
sector should be presumed to be in a permanent state of systemic fragility forever, this 
is a common-sense proposal.  
• M&M says we propose that "concentration charges should become a tool to 
‘structurally’ prevent banks to use their sovereigns as collateral to obtain access to their 
ECB (emergency) credit facilities in conditions of special distress”. The basis for this 
claim appears to be the following sentence on p. 8 (first para): “The diversification of 
banks’ sovereign exposures is not merely a matter of handling the crisis legacy, or a risk 
reduction from its current level associated with high sovereign debt ratios. It should 
rather be viewed as a structural change, in which the loss of the specific role of national 
banking sectors as default absorbers of domestic sovereign debt is more than offset by 
the resilience gains from a well-designed EDIS and the corresponding sharp reduction 
of redenomination risk.” This sentence says nothing about preventing the use of 
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sovereign debt as collateral. In fact, our proposal would not reduce banks’ ability to do 
so, since it is not intended to reduce their aggregate sovereign debt holdings – only 
concentrated exposures to individual sovereigns.     
• With regard to European Deposit Insurance, M&M claim that we advocate to “continue 
imputing banking losses to national compartments even in the final stage”. In fact, what 
we propose is simply a waterfall structure, in which national compartments would 
absorb the ‘first loss’ caused by deposit insurance claims in that country, while the 
mutual compartment would absorb any further losses, regardless of the origin of the 
shock. Any country would benefit from the mutual compartment after its national 
compartment is depleted. Our proposal in fact entails more risk-sharing and less danger 
of financial fragmentation than the one made by Stefano Micossi in a paper published 
a few months ago.3   
2. ESM Tasks 
• M&M say that “PI 91 makes the ESM a direct instrument of creditor countries” because 
we write that programmes must be approved by member states. But this is the case 
already. Furthermore, we advocate greater operational independence of the ESM from 
its political masters: “the ESM should be governed by a sufficiently compact Board of 
Directors, appointed or elected by the members via an IMF-like constituency system. 
To increase the operational independence of the ESM, directors should operate at arm’s 
length from the governments that appoint them.” (p.20).  
• M&M criticise us for proposing that “ESM lending would be normally subject to some 
prior debt restructuring”. Indeed, we are clear that the maturity of junior bonds that we 
propose should be issued as an alternative to sanctions in the case of a violation of the 
fiscal rules must automatically be extended if a country enters an ESM programme. But 
we are equally clear that there should be no automaticity whatsoever for standard 
bonds. Instead, we propose that the ESM should develop a lending policy that would 
lead to a debt restructuring only if this is the only way of restoring solvency to a crisis-
struck country (p. 14). And we go out of our way to refer to debt restructuring as “a last 
resort” when debts are unsustainable (p. 5, p. 9). “Last resort” means that debt 
restructuring would not be used unless it is unavoidable to restore the sustainability of 
sovereign debt. This is very different from making the “ESM normally subject to some 
prior debt restructuring”.  
 
                                                     
3 S. Micossi, “A Blueprint for Completing the Banking Union”, CEPS Policy Insight No. 2017/42, CEPS, Brussels, 27 
November 2017.  
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3. Sovereign debts 
• M&M say that we are seeking a quasi-automatic trigger of restructuring based on 
quantitative indicators. What we actually say, however, is that the ESM should “develop 
its own criteria for deciding when there is a significant risk that an assistance 
programme might not restore solvency to a crisis-struck country” and that “when this 
is the case, it should insist on a private debt restructuring” (p. 14). We add that “when 
introducing such a policy, it is essential to ensure that it does not give rise to the 
expectation that some of the present debts of high-debt countries will inevitably be 
restructured, triggering financial instability in debt markets” (also p. 14). And we use 
the IMF’s new exceptional access policy as a leading example for how such a policy 
might look. This is notable for the fact that it does not involve any hard thresholds or 
rules that would mechanically require countries to restructure as a condition for ESM 
support. We reject the notion that the no-bail-out rule can be made credible by 
introducing ever-harder commitment devices. Instead, we want to make the rule 
credible by lowering the economic and financial disruptions associated with debt 
restructuring, if required as a last-resort solution.  
4. Fiscal discipline 
• M&M pretend that “[our] transparent objective is not only to exclude the Commission 
from any role in negotiating policy goals with member states within the European 
Semester procedures, but also to wrest control of the process from the hands of 
national parliaments”. This is not correct. What we are saying (p.19) is that “while we 
do not oppose the assignment of the chair of the council of ministers to a Commissioner 
– a model that is already used in the case of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security – we are opposed to merging the roles of prosecutor and 
judge”. This leads us to envisage two models, both of which would actually lead to the 
transfer of the chair of the Eurogroup from the Council to the Commission. In one of 
these models, Commissioners would be responsible for both the economic and fiscal 
monitoring and the forging of political compromises. As far as national parliaments are 
concerned, it is hard to see why they would be deprived of any of their prerogatives: 
they currently do not play any role in fiscal surveillance. 
